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Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme
Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic
Moment”
B. Jessie Hill*
This Article approaches the law–politics divide from a new angle. Drawing
on the insights of literary theory, this Article argues that every act of
interpretation, including constitutional interpretation, inevitably draws not only
on text but also on context, and that the relevant context extends beyond both the
written document and the historical context of its origination.
This
understanding derives from speech-act theory and from postmodern literary
theory. As Paul de Man argues in his seminal essay, The Resistance to Theory,
moreover, the act of interpretation always encompasses a “pragmatic moment”
that undermines the effort to attain perfect theoretical coherence. Applying this
perspective to constitutional interpretation, this Article argues that neither
constitutional theory nor politics, on its own, is capable of fully explaining
constitutional interpretation and constitutional change.
In illustrating this phenomenon, this Article draws on recent scholarship
about the recent evolution of constitutional doctrine in two areas—the
Fourteenth Amendment and the religion clauses of the First Amendment—to
demonstrate the dialectical interplay among text, principle, and pragmatism in
constitutional interpretation and constitutional change. Although the insights
regarding the sources of constitutional change in these areas are not new, the
original contribution of this Article lies in its reconfiguration of the theoretical
understanding of how, and why, this change inevitably occurs.

“The legal machine, it turns out, never works exactly as it was programmed
to do. It always produces a little more or a little less than the original,
theoretical input.”1

To say that constitutional law, of late, suffers from a bit of a legitimacy
problem is like saying the Incredible Hulk has some anger management
issues. In the wake of the decision in National Federation of Independent
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, and Laura B.
Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I
would like to thank the members of the Texas Law Review, and the participants in the symposium
on Constitutional Foundations, and in particular Professor Alex Tsesis, who provided invaluable
feedback on an earlier draft.
1. PAUL DE MAN, Promises (Social Contract), in ALLEGORIES OF READING: FIGURAL
LANGUAGE IN ROUSSEAU, NIETZSCHE, RILKE, AND PROUST 246, 271 (1979).
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Business v. Sebelius2 last summer, the Supreme Court’s approval rating fell
well below 50%, and about three-quarters of Americans polled expressed the
view that the Justices decide cases in part based on their personal or political
views.3 Though perhaps more popular than Congress and cockroaches,4 the
Supreme Court’s standing with the public appears to have shrunk of late.
Moreover, worries about the Supreme Court’s legitimacy occasionally
pervade not just popular journalism and legal scholarship, but also the
opinions of the Court itself. Facing major decisions with obvious political
ramifications, the Justices have sometimes expressed concern about the
impact of their decisions on the Court’s appearance of impartiality and its
claim to apolitical referee status. For example, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,5 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, apparently hoping to set to
rest once and for all both the legal and public debate over the
constitutionality of abortion, essentially argued in their joint opinion that they
couldn’t overrule Roe v. Wade6 because, among other reasons, it would look
like they were bowing to political pressure.7 Chief Justice Roberts’s
surprising vote to uphold the individual insurance mandate under the
Affordable Care Act in NFIB may be understood as another version of the
same idea: one might suspect that he voted to uphold the individual mandate
because he recognized that a five-to-four vote along party lines would,
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Adam Liptak, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme
-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all.
4. See Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Congress Less Popular than Cockroaches, Traffic
Jams (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_Natl_010813_.
pdf (indicating that voters have a “higher opinion” of cockroaches than Congress).
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. The plurality opinion stated:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its
decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the
principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
....
. . . Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in
such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the
normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.
. . . [O]nly the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a
surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which
the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the
absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would
subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–67 (plurality opinion).
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despite all his insistence that he is a mere umpire calling the balls as he sees
’em,8 make the Court look like a purely political animal rather than a
legitimate one governed by the rule of law.9 The decision was, in other
words, no less political simply because it was clever.
Yet, legitimacy is a strange creature. To use a familiar legal trope, it
faces, Janus like,10 in two directions: inward, insofar as “legal” legitimacy
requires that judicial decisions adhere to the professional norm of impartial,
consistent, and principled decisionmaking; and outward, insofar as “social”
legitimacy requires courts, who, after all, exercise real-world coercive power
affecting the lives of individual citizens, to reach results that are broadly
acceptable to the public at large.11 The two types of legitimacy may thus be
in tension with one another, such as when principled doctrinal reasoning
leads to a result that would provoke substantial public outrage or resistance.12
At the same time, as the above examples from Casey and NFIB suggest, there
is not always a straight line to be drawn between public opinion and social
legitimacy. Sometimes, greater legitimacy is engendered by bucking public
opinion. And, to put a somewhat more cynical spin on the issue,
“[s]ometimes . . . what is involved in voting against one’s seeming druthers
may be a calculation that the appearance of being ‘principled’ is rhetorically
and politically effective. It fools people.”13 Indeed, the now-standard script
of Supreme Court nomination hearings, in which the nominee compares
himself or herself to an umpire or some similar avatar of blind justice, is
probably primarily a performance intended to shore up the public’s

8. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
9. See Tonja Jacobi, Strategy and Tactics in NFIB v. Sebelius 6, 15–22 (Nw. L. & Econ.
Research Paper No. 12-14, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2133045 (arguing that Roberts’s “driving concern [in NFIB] was for the institutional legitimacy
of the Court”).
10. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 956 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Janus is the god of beginnings and endings who, according to Roman
mythology, had two faces that pointed in opposite directions. Samuel A. Rumore, Jr., Some
Thoughts for the Beginning of 2001, 62 ALA. LAW. 8, 8 (2001).
11. For insightful discussions of the distinction between legal and social legitimacy, see
generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005)
and Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles,
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473 (2007). Also
on point is Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?,
60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 1474 (arguing this tension is both significant and
unavoidable as well as exaggerated); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 157–58 (positing that the Supreme
Court avoids provoking public outrage that could ensue from a decision on a controversial topic by
refusing to rule on it).
13. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 51–52 (2005). Contra the NFIB example, though, Judge Posner argues that such
voting against self-interest occurs primarily when the stakes of the decision are low. Id. at 50–51.
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confidence (and that of the public’s democratically elected representatives),
rather than a sincere and deeply felt statement of judicial philosophy.
Constitutional scholars have attacked the legitimacy problem, along
with the related problem of maintaining the strict divide between law and
politics, from various angles. Originalists have long argued that hewing
closely to constitutional text is the only approach that ensures fidelity to the
document itself and the act of interpretation (as opposed to lawmaking) with
which the Justices have been charged.14 They view such fidelity as
automatically both legitimate and legitimating, since it is the only approach
that remains true to the text that the Framers adopted.15 Proponents of
“living,” or progressive, constitutionalism argue, by contrast, that the Court
cannot be accepted as legitimate if its opinions do not take account of
changing societal circumstances and values.16 Popular constitutionalists, for
their part, argue that we the people should take the Constitution away from
the courts altogether, or that “the people themselves,” in contrast to unelected
and unaccountable judges, should play a central role in interpreting the
Constitution.17
And some “backlash” theorists claim that far from

14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–63
(1989) (arguing that originalism is “more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution
in a democratic system” in that it assigns judges the task of determining original meaning and
democratically elected officials the task of taking account of changing societal values); see also
Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 847, 849, 852, 858–59 (2009) (citing
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999);
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 234 (1988)) (“[T]he original meaning of the
Constitution is the only meaning the People have democratically endorsed.”).
15. See Coan, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2005) (arguing that “courts should take greater account of the Constitution’s
democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and statutory texts”).
17. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7–8 (2004) (“[I]t was ‘the people themselves’––working through and
responding to their agents in the government––who were responsible for seeing that [the
Constitution] was properly interpreted and implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility
over to judges was simply unthinkable.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 181–82 (1999) (“[Populist constitutional law] treats constitutional law not as
something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves.”); see also
Larry D. Kramer, Lectures, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006) (“[Popular
constitutionalism] does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation can take place only in
courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid process of interpretation can be undertaken in the
political branches and by the community at large.”). Professor Barry Friedman gives a brief, helpful
listing of sources both promoting and criticizing popular constitutionalism in BARRY FRIEDMAN,
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 564 n.266 (2009).
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performing a settling function, the Supreme Court’s intervention in highstakes political issues only stokes the flames it was intended to squelch.18
When push comes to shove, though, virtually all agree that the Supreme
Court should have some role in interpreting the Constitution. A principal
point of disagreement centers on how this interpretation should proceed—
specifically, on the extent to which the function of law can and should be
meaningfully distinct from politics. This issue relates to the problem of
determining the extent to which social and cultural facts should influence
legal decisionmaking. Moreover, lurking within this debate is concern about
change in constitutional meaning over time. If legal interpretation is truly
principled, it would appear that it must be insulated against the political
pressures of the time, and therefore much change in constitutional meaning—
especially change that appears to take into account new political and social
circumstances—would prove difficult to explain.19
Drawing on the insights of literary theory, this Article argues that every
act of interpretation, including constitutional interpretation, inevitably draws
not only on text but on context, and that the relevant context extends beyond
both the written document and the historical context of its origination to
contemporary social and cultural facts on the ground. This understanding
derives from speech-act theory and from postmodern literary theory.20 As
Paul de Man argues in his seminal essay, The Resistance to Theory, the act of
interpretation always encompasses a “pragmatic moment” that undermines
the effort to attain perfect theoretical coherence.21 Applying this perspective
to constitutional interpretation, this Article argues that neither constitutional
theory nor politics, on its own, is capable of fully explaining constitutional
interpretation and constitutional change.

18. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–401 (2007) (discussing backlash theories); David
Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a National
Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 741 (2012) (describing the argument that the Court’s
decisions regarding controversial issues creates a backlash against perceived “outside interference”
or “judicial activism” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. But not impossible. One could believe that a particular constitutional provision was
intended or designed to take changing circumstances into account, and thus allowing constitutional
meaning to change would still mean hewing closely to original intent or another principled
approach, such as subscribing to the view that the Constitution serves certain enduring values but
that the content of those values may evolve over time. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 14 (2011) (arguing that the Framers, by choosing to use general and abstract concepts
in the Constitution, meant for future generations to interpret and implement them). Alternately, one
could support a change in meaning on the basis that the original interpretation of a constitutional
provision was simply incorrect.
20. The term “postmodern literary theory” refers to a body of literary, artistic, and philosophical
thought that arose in the second half of the twentieth century as a reaction to modernism and is most
closely associated with deconstruction, a philosophy primarily developed by the French theorist
Jacques Derrida. Kay Torney Souter, The Products of the Imagination: Psychoanalytic Theory and
Postmodern Literary Criticism, 60 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 341, 345 (2000).
21. Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, 63 YALE FRENCH STUD. 3 (1982), reprinted in 33
THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE: THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY 8 (1986).
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In illustrating this phenomenon, this Article draws on examples in two
areas—the Fourteenth Amendment and the religion clauses of the First
Amendment—to demonstrate the dialectical interplay among text, principle,
and pragmatism in constitutional interpretation and constitutional change. Of
course, others have already argued that law and politics need not always exist
in absolute contrast with one another but may instead stand in a dialectical
relationship.22 The principal contribution of this Article, however, is to
propose a new theoretical underpinning for making sense of the relationship
between law and culture, as well as the inherent instability of the law–politics
divide.
Part I of this Article describes the law–politics divide and reviews some
of the important recent scholarship on that subject. The purported distinction
between judging, or interpreting the law, and engaging in political
decisionmaking lies at the heart of much of the anxiety over judicial
legitimacy, as well as of debates over the merits of originalism as compared
to living constitutionalism.23 As this Article will demonstrate, the distinction
between the two, while not meaningless, is nonetheless inherently unstable.
Part II begins to make this case by reviewing Paul de Man’s classic essay
The Resistance to Theory, which elucidates the process of literary
interpretation and applies it in general terms to constitutional interpretation.
Part III then puts this theory to work through examples drawn from notable
constitutional controversies. Finally, Part IV asks why and how this
particular perspective makes any difference to our understanding of
constitutional interpretation.
I.

Law and Politics

In a Harvard Law Review Foreword from a few years ago, Judge
Richard Posner argued that, as a constitutional court, the Supreme Court is
inherently and inevitably a political court.24 In so stating, Judge Posner
implicitly and explicitly contrasted politics with “law.”25 Though it is
supposed to be “tethered to authoritative texts,” the argument proceeds,26 the
Supreme Court is instead profoundly political because of certain structural
features—particularly, its responsibility to decide emotional, politically
polarizing constitutional issues; the open-ended and broad nature of the
constitutional text, which fails to impose any meaningful internal constraints
on the Justices; and the lack of external constraints on the Justices’

22. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 376.
23. I use the term “living constitutionalism” here to refer to all nonoriginalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, with the recognition that both originalism and nonoriginalism are
heterogeneous schools of thought. The point is to distinguish among constitutional theories on this
one dimension, rather than to lump all originalist or nonoriginalist constitutional theories together.
24. Posner, supra note 13, at 39–54.
25. Id. at 45–46.
26. Id. at 40.
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decisionmaking.27 For Posner, the political nature of constitutional law is
both lamentable and inevitable.28
Others have argued that the encroachment of politics on constitutional
law is not completely unavoidable, but that the temptation of results-oriented
judging is great, and undermines the legitimacy of the law, all the same.
Thus, according to this perspective, “constitutional law defines its integrity
precisely in terms of its independence from political influence. From the
internal perspective of the law, the law–politics distinction is constitutive of
legality.”29 The most famous proponent of this view is probably Herbert
Wechsler,30 but it continues to resonate in contemporary discourse.31
From yet another perspective, originalism may be understood, at least in
part, as a response to the problem of law’s legitimacy and the need to keep it
distinct from politics. Though the proposition is far from being beyond
debate, originalists generally contend that their mode of interpretation is
more principled because it is tied to the one meaning that was democratically
adopted by the people of the United States, and that, unlike nonoriginalists,
they are not free to impose their own values on the texts they decode.32
Thus, for example, Justice Scalia’s famous defense of originalism contends
that, because the purpose of the Constitution is “precisely to prevent the law
from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting
the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable,” originalism is the best
mode of achieving the Constitution’s goals.33 Indeed, Justice Scalia argues
that originalism avoids “aggravat[ing] the principal weakness of the system,
for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from
the preferences of the judge himself.”34
In contrast to these various worrying approaches to the law–politics
divide, some scholars have embraced the influence of popular attitudes on
law as not only structurally inevitable, but also as a positive influence that
should be embraced, at least to some degree, rather than suppressed.
Proponents of “democratic constitutionalism,” for example, argue that
“constitutional meaning bends to the insistence of popular beliefs and yet

27. Id. at 39–43.
28. See id. at 76.
29. Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 384.
30. See, e.g., Hebert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 11–12 (1959) (identifying “the deepest problem of our constitutionalism” as finding
“criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of
willfulness or will”).
31. Regarding the resonance of the view of law as distinct from politics because of its
principled nature, see supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Coan, supra note 14, at 852, 857 (acknowledging the defenses of originalism
based on democracy and judicial restraint). The criticisms of this assertion are well-known and
need not be repeated here. For an overview, see generally id.
33. Scalia, supra note 14, at 862.
34. Id. at 864.
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simultaneously retains integrity as law.”35 Professors Robert Post and Reva
Siegel argue that the Court cannot avoid public controversy surrounding the
sorts of cases it hears, nor can it avoid being influenced by popular
understandings of the Constitution; judges, therefore, must acknowledge the
conflicting sides in a constitutional debate and “assess the . . . relevant
constitutional values,” employing “exquisite sensitivity to context.”36
Similarly, Professors Robert Post and Neil Siegel assert that principled legal
reasoning should not be understood to be incompatible with the expression of
“fundamental social values,” which they argue is, itself, one purpose of the
law.37 Thus, professional legal reasoning is and should be “in dialogue with
public values.”38 Finally, in a recent book, Professor Barry Friedman argues
that the popular will has always influenced judicial understandings, and vice
versa.39 And so far, at least, the sky has not fallen.
This Article is mostly in line with this last line of thought regarding the
law–politics divide. It argues that the distinction is neither as important nor
as firm as legal-process scholars and originalists seem to suggest. It suggests
a different reason for this view, however—one that is based in the nature of
language itself, rather than in the structure of our political system or the
nature of judging. By the same token, this analysis also suggests that
theoretical coherence in the act of interpretation is inevitably undermined by
the reality that interpretation must reach beyond the text itself to the messy
social and political context in which it exists.
Before moving on to that linguistic explanation, however, it is important
to clarify just what is meant by “politics.” The term “politics” can have
multiple meanings, and the above-described schools of thought regarding the
law–politics divide seem to deploy various ones. In some views, “politics” is
synonymous with ideology or, what may amount to the same thing, personal
predilection. This seems to be the sense in which Judge Posner uses the
term.40 Many originalists also seem most concerned about the influence of
politics in that sense of the term. Another meaning of “politics,” however,
would be public opinion or (to use a more elevated term) public values—
with the term “public” perhaps serving as a stand-in for “majority” or
“widely shared.” This is the sense in which democratic constitutionalists and
their ilk appear to understand the term. Finally, one might use the term
“politics” to refer simply to political and cultural reality, or pragmatic

35. Post & Siegel, supra note 18, at 376.
36. See id. at 425–27 (suggesting that judges need not avoid controversy in order to maintain
their proper judicial role).
37. Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 1510.
38. Id. at 1510–11.
39. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17.
40. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 13, at 51 (referring to “conventional ‘left’ and ‘right’
ideologies”); Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1654 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics]
(describing political platforms, such as Marxism and Communism, as ideologies).
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considerations of the context and impact of judicial decisions. Though this is
a less common usage of the term, it also appears to play a role in the
democratic constitutionalists’ understandings of politics and is often opposed
to law in scholarly discourse. It is in this last sense—the most general
sense—that I use the term here in arguing that politics inevitably plays a role
in interpretation.
II.

Resistance to Constitutional Theory

In his seminal essay The Resistance to Theory, Paul de Man lays out a
metatheoretical argument—a theory about literary theory.41 In part, the essay
is an attempt to understand what, if anything, makes literary theory distinct
from other disciplines and practices, such as philosophy, that exert a
gravitational pull upon it.42 This central dilemma, of course, calls to mind
the debate over the uniqueness of legal and constitutional theory, which
partakes of other disciplines but seeks to remain independent of them.43
Ultimately, de Man proposes that “[l]iterary theory may now well have
become a legitimate concern of philosophy but it cannot be assimilated to it,”
because literary theory “contains a necessarily pragmatic moment that
certainly weakens it as theory but that adds a subversive element of
unpredictability and makes it something of a wild card in the serious game of
the theoretical disciplines.”44 The subversive unpredictability of literary
theory is what de Man calls “resistance,” and that resistance comes not only
from outside but also from within the theory itself.45 As explained below,
de Man’s conclusions apply to, and have significant consequences for,
constitutional theory as well.
According to de Man, the rise of literary theory46 corresponds to the rise
of a certain linguistic self-consciousness in the twentieth century—the
newfound focus on language and the meaning and function of signification,
which was accompanied by the recognition that there is a difference—a kind
of play in the joints—between words and the objects or concepts to which
they refer.47 This recognition was accompanied by a growing acceptance of
the view that language and meaning are functions of convention rather than
of some sort of natural or inevitable mechanism.48 The conventional view of
language, of course, is one of the fundamental postulates of postmodernism;
it leads to the conclusion that the relationship between words and the real41. de Man, supra note 21, at 3.
42. Id. at 4–5. So-called continental philosophy has been particularly influential within
postmodern literary theory. Id. at 7–8.
43. See, e.g., Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1693–98 (criticizing the view that moral
theory should inform legal decisionmaking).
44. de Man, supra note 21, at 8.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Literary theory is here contrasted with “literary history” and “literary criticism.” Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 8–10.
48. Id.
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world objects they refer to is both arbitrary and unstable.49 Yet, according to
de Man, it is a view that is not always embraced, and it is one that
ideologues, in particular, reject: as de Man puts it,
[N]o one in his right mind will try to grow grapes by the luminosity of
the word “day,” but it is very difficult not to conceive the pattern of
one’s past and future existence as in accordance with temporal and
spatial schemes that belong to fictional narratives and not to the
world.50
In other words, we easily understand in some cases, as with everyday words
like “day,” that the word and the object to which it refers are distinct; it is
much harder, however, to recognize that our most deeply held beliefs and
perceptions of the world do not necessarily reflect a fixed and natural reality.
Thus, he continues, “[I]deology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with
natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism.”51
De Man contends, however, that it is the function of literary theory to
unmask this very tendency to confuse. Literary theory thus defeats ideology,
and ideological attempts to discredit literary theory consequently evidence
the critics’ “fear at having their own ideological mystifications exposed by
the tool they are trying to discredit.”52 Yet, at the same time, literary theory
itself encounters resistance—a resistance from within, which de Man
suggests is an inevitable, constituent element of the theoretical project
itself.53 De Man explains that this “resistance” is a “resistance to the use of
language about language,” as well as to “language itself or to the possibility
that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to
intuition.”54
Central to de Man’s argument are a dichotomy and a trichotomy, or
trivium. The dichotomy is between theory and aesthetics. Theory, of course,
means the same thing in the context of literary theory as in constitutional
theory: an attempt to construct a closed system with the power to explain
substantially all facts or events within a given universe, but which is itself
speculative rather than factual.55 Aesthetics, by contrast, involves attention
to pleasurable, beautiful, or other sensory aspects of language—an embrace
of the phenomenological effects of language in the real world.56 An aesthetic
approach to poetry, for example, might be one that emphasizes the sounds of

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
See Wlad Godzich, Foreword to 33 THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE: THE
RESISTANCE TO THEORY ix, xiii (1986) (defining theory as “a system of concepts that aims to give a
global explanation to an area of knowledge” which is “oppose[d] . . . to praxis by virtue of the fact
that it is a form of speculative knowledge”).
56. See de Man, supra note 21, at 7–8.
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the words and the harmonious effects of particular rhyme and rhythm
schemes. An aesthetic reading of the Constitution might involve an
appreciation of the elegance of its language—a not wholly ridiculous, but
also not apparently useful, undertaking for lawyers to engage in.
At the same time, the concept of aesthetics as deployed by de Man can
be understood more broadly, to refer to any focus on the real-world effects of
language. This aesthetic approach is opposed to a theoretical reading that
understands a text as an instantiation of a particular world view, ideology, or
interpretive theory.57 Such theoretical readings inevitably attempt to
assimilate the text to the overarching explanatory system that claims to
comprehend it. The aesthetic approach, by contrast, pretends to no such
grand ambition.
Related to the theory–aesthetics dichotomy is the classical trivium of
logic, grammar, and rhetoric, which represented the sum total of language
and linguistics in classical thought.58 Classical linguistics established a
hierarchy, in which logic, which is related both to philosophy and
mathematics, stood at the top.59 As de Man explains, this prioritization of
logic, as well as its affiliation with mathematics, entails a “continuity
between a theory of language, as logic, and the knowledge of the
phenomenal world”—a belief that language, as the vehicle of logic, closely
reflects the reality of the world around us.60
Grammar, in the middle, was the study of language with the aim of
understanding how language essentially operationalizes the principles of
logic.61 And rhetoric, the lowest in the hierarchy, was comprised simply of
the study of persuasive or figurative language—of literary tropes, which were
extensively catalogued in grammatical terms, and their deployment in the
service of persuasion.62 This hierarchy helps to construct a particular
relationship between theory and aesthetics, or reality on the ground.63 There
is a correspondence between them, in which theory (logic) is understood to
reflect, by virtue of human reason, reality (aesthetics).64 But theory, as the
product of reason, clearly stands above base reality, which lies constantly in
need of analysis and interpretation.

57. Id. at 10–11.
58. Christopher Norris, Law, Deconstruction, and the Resistance to Theory, 15 J.L. & SOC’Y
166, 177 (1988).
59. See id.
60. de Man, supra note 21, at 13.
61. Norris, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. See de Man, supra note 21, at 13 (equating, implicitly, the relationship between language,
as logic, and knowledge of the phenomenal world, which is accessible through mathematics, with
the relationship between theory and aesthetics).
64. See id. at 14 (“The continuity between theory and phenomenalism is asserted and preserved
by the system itself.”).
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De Man readopts this classical trio, not as a hierarchy but rather as an
exemplar of the inevitable tensions within interpretation.65 In postmodern
literary theory, which rejects the preeminence of logic and the corresponding
notion of a natural or inevitable symmetry between language and reality, the
hierarchy is at the very least inverted—the rhetorical aspect of language takes
precedence over its logical aspect.66 De Man claims that “reading”—which
for him means a close reading that is particularly attentive to the multiple
possible meanings of a text—partakes of both grammar and rhetoric and is a
privileged site of tension between them.67 In particular, de Man argues that
“the grammatical decoding of a text leaves a residue of indetermination that
. . . cannot be[] resolved by grammatical means.”68 The resistance to
(literary) theory is thus, in essence, a resistance to reading. The resistance to
theory—really, a resistance within theory—is thus a resistance to that which
ultimately undermines any attempt to systematize the meaning of the text—it
is an attentiveness to the uncertainties, the indeterminacies, and the
inconvenient moments within the text itself, which assimilate poorly to grand
overarching theories, or resist that assimilation altogether. For de Man, these
moments are created by “figural” language, which by its very essence opens
up multiple and often self-contradictory meanings, all of which may be
technically, or “grammatically,” correct.69 Yet, the “literary” text is not the
only kind of text that presents this dilemma—de Man claims that, while more
explicit in literature, the figurative dimension of language—the aspect of
language that escapes easy grammatical clarification yielding only one
possible correct meaning—“can be revealed in any verbal event when it is
read textually.”70
De Man ties his theory of reading to speech-act theory. Like
postmodern literary theory, speech-act theory has recognized the essentially
conventional nature of language and, thus, of meaning.71 For de Man,

65. Id. at 13.
66. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL INTERROGATIONS
140 (1991) (describing how postmodern theory emphasizes rhetoric over “any systematic or
comprehensive theoretical position”).
67. de Man, supra note 21, at 15.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 16 (discussing this problem in the context of interpreting the meaning of the title
of Keats’s The Fall of Hyperion and noting that “[f]aced with the ineluctable necessity to come to a
decision, no grammatical or logical analysis can help us out”).
70. Id. at 17. Thus, “once a reader has become aware of the rhetorical dimensions of a text, he
will not be amiss in finding textual instances that are irreducible to grammar or to historically
determined meaning.” Id. at 18.
71. Id. at 18–19. As I have explained elsewhere, what I call “meaning” here roughly correlates
with “illocutionary force” in the parlance of speech-act theory. See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious
Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 511–
14 (2005). “Illocutionary force” is often defined as the effect of language—what language does or
what act it performs (asserting, urging, certifying, begging)—rather than what the individual words
denote. See John Searle, What is a Speech Act?, in THE COMMUNICATION THEORY READER 263
(Paul Cobley ed., 1996).
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speech-act theory is correct to recognize the conventional nature of meaning
but is wrong to suggest that it is reducible to convention, especially insofar as
it aspires to fix and determine, once and for all, the functioning of language
by specifying all of the conventional elements that produce a particular kind
of meaning (or “illocutionary force”).72 But speech-act theory can also be
read in light of postmodernism’s understanding of language as inevitably
context-bound and of context as boundless.73 A speech-act theory that does
not fall prey to the attempt to create a totalizing language system that tames
and controls all possible meaning is one that recognizes the dependency of
language on context—not just the immediate textual context but also the
historical and social context in which it is read.74
For de Man, postmodern literary theory, in so far as it engages in
reading, always reads texts in essentially the same way—as both asserting
and performing their own indeterminacy.75 Reading thus dramatizes the
failure of language to reach the certainty and the reflectiveness of reality to
which it appears to aspire—or, put differently, the ability of language to
escape any and every attempt to pin it to a single meaning or reference.76 As
such, these postmodern readings are in fact “theory and not theory at the
same time, the universal theory of the impossibility of theory.”77
Whatever interest de Man’s argument holds—hopefully as more than a
historical artifact—its application to constitutional theory may not be
immediately apparent. In this Article, I certainly hope to steer clear of the
classical critical legal theory brand of meaning-debunking, itself definitively
debunked by Stanley Fish and others.78 Rather, I wish to contend that de

72. de Man, supra note 21, at 19. De Man refers to classical theorists of speech acts, such as
John Searle and J.L. Austin.
73. See, e.g., Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for
Artistic Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1541–42 (1996) (“Meaning is context-bound, but
context is boundless.” (quoting JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND
CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 123 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Hill, supra
note 71, at 514–16 (“Context, however, is itself an extremely unstable device for discerning
meaning. Although meaning is dependent on context, it is usually impossible to fully describe or
delimit the relevant context . . . .”).
74. Hill, supra note 71, at 517–22. An originalist might acknowledge the importance of context
but argue that meaning should be dependent only on the context in which it was written. There are,
however, several difficulties with this view. One is that historical context is virtually impossible to
recapture in full; another is that constitutional language must continue to be applied in new,
contemporary contexts and speak to contemporary problems. Few, if any, originalists would go so
far as to say that constitutional language means only what it could have meant in the context of late
eighteenth-century America. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008)
(Scalia, J.) (rejecting as “bordering on the frivolous” the notion that only those arms available at the
founding are encompassed by the Second Amendment’s protections).
75. de Man, supra note 21, at 15–19.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Norris, supra note 58, at 173 (citing Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory,
96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1796 n.60 (1987)).
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Man’s argument has several specific implications for the project of
constitutional theory.
First, de Man’s point that language inevitably tends to take on a life of
its own and thereby to resist any attempt at fitting all meaning within a neat,
totalizing theory would seem to apply to legal language as well as literary.
For this protean quality of language is at least in part a feature of language’s
inevitable dependence on context and the underlying change within that
(social, historical, political) context. The failure of theory to make sense of
language is particularly apparent with respect to originalist theories, which
are obviously undermined by the understanding that language takes on new
meanings in light of changed circumstances. Any theory that claims to
assimilate the text entirely to it, de Man suggests, is refusing to really “read”
that text.79
It is important to recognize, however, that de Man is not here making a
general claim that meaning is always indeterminate and unknowable, nor is
that a claim I wish to make here. He does argue, however, that the meaning
of texts—including legal texts—cannot be specified in any transcendent or
permanent way. There is no meaning, whether based on the text alone or on
the framers’ intent, that can answer questions about how the text should
apply in new and unanticipated circumstances.80 Thus, the ways in which
any constitutional theory is constantly questioned and ultimately undermined
by the changing social context in which the constitutional text must be read
and applied is precisely the “resistance” to and within theory to which
de Man refers.
This resistance is, moreover, on the view of postmodern speech-act
theorists, inherent in the dependency of all speech acts on context.81 The
context dependency of meaning may seem intuitive, of course, but it also
derives from the recognition that language is conventional. Although one
might argue that words have definitions that can be found in an objective
way—for example by looking in a dictionary, utterances (sentences or
speech acts) can only have meaning in a particular context. Thus, the phrase
“I do” means very little standing on its own, typed on a page; it carries great
significance, both legal and cultural, if it is said in the context of a marriage
ceremony in which all of the relevant formalities have been met; and it is
surely decipherable but carries decidedly less weight if it is spoken in a play,
in front of an actor who is dressed as, and to everyone’s understanding is
merely pretending to be, a justice of the peace.82 This context dependency is
79. For examples of this phenomenon, see infra Part III. “Reading,” for de Man, means close
reading, with special attention to the multiple meanings and potential for indeterminacy within a
text. de Man, supra note 21, at 24.
80. See DE MAN, supra note 1, at 270–71; Norris, supra note 58, at 175–76.
81. CULLER, supra note 73, at 123–24; Hill, supra note 71, at 515.
82. But see LEMONY SNICKET, A SERIES OF UNFORTUNATE EVENTS NO. 1: THE BAD
BEGINNING 133–44 (1999) (narrating the story of a mischievous count who tries to steal an
orphan’s fortune by staging a play in which the orphan plays the part of the count’s bride-to-be and,
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generalizable, of course, and it stretches beyond the example of certain
formalities being required in order for a speech act to have legal force.83
Yet context is both impossible to specify completely and always
changing.84 As Jonathan Culler puts it, “Meaning is context-bound, but
context is boundless.”85 Context is boundless in the sense that it can always
be further specified, as any lawyer knows. The exercise of distinguishing
disfavorable precedent is often nothing more than the act of highlighting an
element of the factual context in the prior case that may have escaped notice
or seemed unimportant at the time but that is infused with significance for the
later case.86 And no matter how carefully one tries to delimit the context—to
specify the rules under which a certain expression means a certain thing—a
new context can always be created that evades the rules one creates.87
Jonathan Culler gives the example of a sign in an airport informing
passengers that all remarks about bombs will be taken seriously: what
meaning would we impute, he asks, if a passenger approached an airport
worker and asked, “If I were to remark that I had a bomb in my shoe, you
would have to take it seriously, wouldn’t you?”88 Could the problem be
solved by specifying that remarks about remarks about bombs must be taken
seriously? And so on, and so on, in an infinite regress?89
Importantly, part of the unmanageable and illimitable context is the
cultural and political context, which has particular importance for
constitutional interpretation. Thus, the constantly changing context of
politics, culture, and facts on the ground—what de Man might call the
aesthetic—is inevitably bound up with the act of interpretation, just as it also,
equally inevitably, escapes the totalizing attempts of theory. This context is
the “pragmatic moment” that is essential to constitutional interpretation but
weakens constitutional theory.90

unbeknownst to her, the woman playing the justice of the peace is an actual justice who performs an
actual, valid marriage ceremony on stage). I employ the “I do” example in Hill, supra note 71, at
512.
83. Sometimes the context even includes that which is not written. For example, Akhil Amar
notes that Chief Justice John Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 353–56
(1819), drew on the use of the word “necessary” in other contexts, including outside the
Constitution itself, to demonstrate that, if the Framers had meant to give Congress only those
powers explicitly delegated in the Constitution, it would have said so. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 800 (1999). According to Amar, “Marshall is contrasting
the actual wording of the Constitution not merely with what it could have said . . . or with what
another clause of the Constitution does say . . . . Rather, he is contrasting the text of the
Constitution with what its predecessor document said.” Id.
84. Hill, supra note 71, at 515–16.
85. CULLER, supra note 73, at 123.
86. Hill, supra note 71, at 515–16.
87. Id.
88. CULLER, supra note 73, at 124–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See id. at 125.
90. Professor Stanley Fish makes a similar point in arguing that the practice of judging and
theories of legal interpretation are entirely distinct and, indeed, have nothing to do with one another.
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At this point an originalist or textualist might raise an objection to my
insistence that the present, ever-changing political and cultural context is the
context in which the Constitution must be interpreted. Originalists, after all,
believe that the “original public meaning” of a term is the relevant one.91
And what are originalism and its cousin textualism, if not themselves dreams
of a return to a strict form of reading? This might appear to suggest that the
problem posed for interpretation by the ever-changing context of the present
is thus solved by an original-public-meaning approach according to
originalists.
But this objection misses the mark in several respects. First, the reading
that originalists espouse is not a de Manian reading—rather, it is a sort of
prelapsarian reading, a perfect reading that itself resembles theory in its
attempt to achieve one true and coherent past truth. But any text can only be
read in the present, not in the past; the influence of context thus pervades
interpretation whether the interpreter wishes it to or not.92 Indeed, to think
that one’s reconstruction of a past context is the same as actually discovering
what an utterance meant to some “original public” bears a striking
resemblance to the exercise of trying to grow grapes by the luminosity of the
word “day.”93 Or, as Professor Jamal Greene puts it, “At no point in our
constitutional history did any democratically responsible institution
determine and embody within a text the notion that state and local actors
should be bound by Justice Scalia’s considered view of the eighteenthcentury meaning of the Bill of Rights.”94 While originalists may be partly
correct in claiming that the goal of interpretation is to discover the original
intent behind an utterance, they deny that there is a difference between this
reconstruction of original intent and the actual intent itself.
Moreover, as I have explained elsewhere, the very nature of meaning as
convention driven implies that it must also be capable of repetition: an
utterance can only function as meaningful if it can be repeated in different

They are different practices with different goals. See Fish, supra note 78, at 1785–87 (claiming that
judging does not involve adherence to an “underlying set of rules and principles” but should instead
strive for pragmatic coherence in decisionmaking).
91. Or at least, this is what the “new originalists” think. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett,
Interpretation and Construction] (“[O]riginalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that
identifies the meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment.”); Randy E.
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 627–29 (1999) (“The public
meaning of the words of the Constitution . . . could be gleaned from a number of sources, including
the records of the convention, but where those intentions differed from the public understanding, it
is the public meaning that should prevail.”). See generally Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610–11 (2008).
92. Cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on
“The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1518–19
(1999) (describing legal interpretation as a performance in which interpretive choices must be made
and audiences persuaded anew each time).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
94. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 988 (2012).
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contexts and still be comprehensible.95 Yet each repetition also opens up the
possibility of the utterance’s meaning being changed:
If language is conventional, it must function according to a set of
learnable, and thus reproducible, rules. The functionality of language
depends, in other words, on its ability to be repeated—on the ability of
certain speech acts to be replicated in a variety of contexts. This
ability to be repeated, or “iterability,” also means that any linguistic
utterance is capable of being cut off from both its original context and
its speaker’s intent to be reproduced in a context that may change or
undermine its prior meaning. Indeed, no speech act could function at
all if this were not the case—that is, if it were not both conventional
and iterable. The conventionality and iterability of speech acts ensure
that the speech act can be recognized, understood, and reproduced by
different speakers and listeners, but they also ensure that language can
be used in ways that may not have been originally intended.96
The context dependency of language, which gives rise to its iterability, is
thus the element that creates the possibility that any purportedly fixed,
intentional meaning can always be undermined. In addition, it throws into
question the originalist notion of a distinction between “interpretation” and
“construction.” As Professor Randy Barnett explains it, “Interpretation is
the activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of
language in context. Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to
particular factual circumstances.”97 But as Barnett himself acknowledged,
meaning must be specified “in context”; words do not have any meaning—
and certainly not a fixed meaning—without a context.98 Even assuming one
could agree with originalists that the era of enactment is the relevant
historical context, moreover, it must be acknowledged that determining the
boundaries of the relevant context is itself an interpretive choice. One must
make decisions about whether the context of the word “necessary” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause includes only the words of the Clause itself, the
entire Constitution (which includes the same word in Article II, Section 3 and
the synonym “needful” in Article IV, Section 3), or all contemporary uses of
the word.99 Moreover, one might reasonably question how, precisely, to
delineate the historical time period that one can consider in determining
“contemporary” uses and whether meaning can really be pinpointed to a
particular moment in time. For example, is the Slaughter-House100 Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed below, sufficiently

95. B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in
Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 738–39 (2010).
96. Id. at 738 (footnote omitted).
97. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 91, at 66.
98. See id. at 67–68.
99. Amar, supra note 83, at 755–58 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819)).
100. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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contemporaneous to deserve equal weight with the Amendment’s framers’
own views? At each turn a choice must be made to enforce linguistic clarity
against the inevitable tendency of meaning to multiply once a word is
committed to paper. Choices always must be made among possible
meanings, as meaning does not exist without context. All interpretation is
also construction.
Finally, the very structure of a constitution itself suggests that an
attempt merely to construct past meaning is wrongheaded. As de Man argues
in an essay on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, a social contract
“never refers to a situation that exists in the present, but signals toward a
hypothetical future . . . . All laws are future-oriented and prospective; their
illocutionary mode is that of the promise.”101 Those promises are understood
to have been made at some past time, but their legitimacy must be verified
and accepted in the present, at the moment of the state’s application of
coercive force.102 This would seem to be the understanding on which any
social contract—and thus any constitution—must be based. Therefore,
“‘when the Law speaks in the name of the people, it is in the name of the
people of today and not of the past’. The definition of this ‘people of today’
is impossible, however, for the eternal present of the contract can never apply
as such to any particular present.”103
III. Examples
What follows are examples of how the language of the Constitution,
read closely, escapes any attempt to fix it, and of how provisional meaning
can be reached only by means of considering the broader social and political
context. Of course, de Man’s point about language, as I have described it, is
sufficiently general that it would have to apply to all language and a true
demonstration, rather than an illustration, of it would have to be considerably
more exhaustive than what I offer here. But given the limitations of time and
space, I offer instead two brief examples to show how one might connect
de Man’s theory to constitutional interpretation and the failures of
constitutional theory, particularly originalism.
A.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause

Could there be a clearer example of original intent than the Fourteenth
Amendment’s intended overruling of Dred Scott v. Sandford’s104 holding that
African-Americans are not “citizens” of the United States?105 Even the
conservative Slaughter-House Court recognized that this was the inevitable
101. DE MAN, supra note 1, at 273; see also Norris, supra note 58, at 174–76, 180 (discussing
the same passage in relation to legal interpretation).
102. See DE MAN, supra note 1, at 273.
103. Id. (internal citation omitted).
104. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Scott, 60 U.S. at 422–23.
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import of that provision.106 Yet the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause, from Dred Scott to the Civil Rights Cases,107 is a prime
example of how language and intent are often in tension, and of how even the
clearest of texts may fail to enact its framers’ intentions.
Dred Scott, of course, is the original sin of originalism and a founding
member of the “anticanon.”108 In that opinion, Chief Justice Taney
infamously held that blacks were not “citizens” within the meaning of
Article III for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and therefore could not
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.109 Taney concluded that Scott
was not a citizen—a member of the political community entitled to the
“privileges and immunities” possessed by other citizens—not simply because
of his status as a slave (which made him “property” rather than a person), but
because of his race and ancestry.110 In reaching this conclusion, Taney began
with the following proposition: “The words ‘people of the United States’ and
‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing”—namely, the
sovereign people, the political community, and the individuals who govern
and are governed.111 As evidence of this proposition, Taney pointed to the
intentions of the Framers as contained in the Preamble to the Constitution,
noting that:
It declares that it is formed by the people of the United States; that is
to say, by those who were members of the different political
communities in the several States; and its great object is declared to be
to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity. It
speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of
citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the exercise of
the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen. It does not
define what description of persons are intended to be included under
these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the

106. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) (noting the Fourteenth
Amendment “declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their
citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States”).
107. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
108. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 406–08 (2011)
(identifying Dred Scott as part of the American anticanon and referring to Chief Justice Taney’s
originalism as “bad originalism”).
109. Scott, 60 U.S. at 427. Specifically, Taney formulated the question as follows:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,
become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in
the Constitution.
Id. at 403.
110. Id. at 403, 408, 422–23.
111. Id. at 404.

1834

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1815

people. It uses them as terms so well understood, that no further
description or definition was necessary.112
Thus, according to Taney, African-Americans were not a part of the
people nor were they citizens, based on an understanding that was not made
explicit because it was too clear to explain. Taney further listed, in
excruciating detail, all of the reasons why the Framers could not possibly
have imagined including African-Americans within this category when they
drafted Article III and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.113
Taney applied originalism with a vengeance, privileging original intent over
reasonable claims about the meaning of the text on its face.114
It was, of course, against this backdrop and that of the subsequent Civil
War that the Fourteenth Amendment declared, “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”115 No
longer could African-Americans be denied national citizenship on the theory
embraced by Dred Scott, since the Fourteenth Amendment grounded
citizenship in the irresistible biological fact of being born in the United
States.
Yet, famously, it took only a few years for the Supreme Court to void
that language of much of its power by defining the “privileges and
immunities” that attached to that citizenship—guaranteed in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s next clause116—as referring only to those rights that
individuals possessed by virtue of their relationship to the federal
government.117 Those rights included such relatively insignificant powers as
the right to travel to the national capital to petition or conduct business with
the federal government; to claim protection of the federal government while
on the high seas; and “free access to its seaports, through which all
operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land
offices, and courts of justice in the several States.”118 To say that the
Slaughter-House Court literally nullified the meaning of the Citizenship
Clause would hardly be an exaggeration, since, as pointed out by the dissent,
all of those rights were already protected by the Constitution’s Supremacy

112. Id. at 410–11.
113. Id. at 406–09, 411–26.
114. Id. at 410 (“The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human
family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is
too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration . . . .”).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. Id. cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
118. Id.
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Clause, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment was not even needed to
guarantee them.119
The Slaughter-House Court achieved its feat by means of a clever
intratextual argument, which demonstrates just how susceptible the text is to
escaping whatever original intentions it may have embodied. The phrase
“privileges or immunities” in the Fourteenth Amendment seems intentionally
chosen to mirror the “privileges and immunities” language of Article IV.
That language, of course, had already been interpreted to refer to
“fundamental” rights,120 so it seemed natural to assume that those were the
rights that Congress meant to encompass within national citizenship and
extend to America’s newest citizens. Yet, the language’s verbatim
repetition121 is precisely what opened it up to the opposite reading—a reading
that assumed national citizenship, and its attendant privileges and
immunities, must be distinct from state citizenship.122 This one textual move,
in one fell swoop, emptied the Citizenship Clause of virtually all of its
content. Similarly, the Court acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment’s
dual citizenship language, which proclaimed “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States” to be “citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside,” and promptly turned it on its head.123 While it
may be true, as the Court asserted, that Congress thereby created a category
of national citizenship that was independent of state citizenship and to which
all U.S.-born or -naturalized individuals were entitled, the Court again
exploited this distinction to minimize the content of national citizenship,
rather than to endow it with robust meaning, as the framers had likely
intended.124
The Slaughter-House Cases thus place into bold relief the inherent
ability of language to escape its original context and take on new meanings.
Even identical language within the same document may not always be
interpreted in the same way; the repetition itself can suggest either that the
meaning should be understood consistently or precisely the opposite—that
the use in two different contexts was intended to produce two different and
even contrasting meanings. Of course, one possibility is that the historical
context of Slaughter-House resulted in this arguably unwarranted

119. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 22–23 (1980).
120. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 75–76 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
121. Well, almost verbatim. Article IV refers to “privileges and immunities,” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (emphasis added), while the Fourteenth Amendment, since it is phrased as a prohibition,
states that no state can deprive a citizen of the “privileges or immunities” of citizenship, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
122. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74–78.
123. Id. at 73–74; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
124. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74, 79; see, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (1952).
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interpretation. The waning enthusiasm for Reconstruction even in the North,
economic depression, and the labor unrest of the early 1870s no doubt
influenced the majority’s view of the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments and of the privileges and immunities to which all U.S. citizens
are entitled.125 Moreover, the immediate factual context of the case—a suit
brought not by blacks to vindicate their civil rights but by Southern whites to
vindicate economic rights—likely influenced the probusiness Court to cabin
the meaning of the Amendment’s provisions.126
The Court’s opinion in Slaughter-House thus demonstrates that
language possesses an ineluctable capacity to escape both theory and intent,
as de Man argued. The terms of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment were undoubtedly aimed at granting a meaningful equality,
accompanied by substantive rights, to African-Americans. Yet, in SlaughterHouse the language presented itself in a new and frightening context—both
in the sense that the suit was brought by white litigants seeking economic
equality, and in the sense that the failures and tensions of Reconstruction had
become manifest. Indeed, it is, first, the very potential for using the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect a broader swath of the population,
including whites clamoring for economic protection, which demonstrates this
quality of language. While the notion that the rights proclaimed by the Civil
War Amendments might extend beyond blacks to all members of society
might not have been entirely foreign to the Amendment’s framers,127 its
presentation here may well have been unanticipated. The combination of
“the free labor ideology of the time,”128 which led the butchers to present
their case in terms of a fundamental right to exercise one’s trade, and
increasing concern about claims of the have-nots to economic citizenship,
might have made the country look very different in 1872 than it had in 1868.
Whether such historical factors completely explain the Court’s decision
or not, the fact remains that the inherent openness of language, due to its
dependency on both context and iterability, make the Slaughter-House
Court’s reading possible. The use of the words “privileges and immunities,”
which was likely intended to incorporate guarantees of fundamental rights
already identified under Article IV, Section 1 against the states, as well as the
use of the term “citizenship” to confer both state citizenship and national
125. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 524–31
(1988) (explaining how the depression, labor movement, and electoral realignment of 1874
“strongly affected prevailing attitudes toward Reconstruction”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 16,
at 146–49 (noting the almost universally positive reception of the decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases).
126. FONER, supra note 125, at 529–30.
127. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 119, at 23–24 (“Abolitionist concerns had broadened over time
. . . from a narrow focus on the rights of blacks to a broader occupation with the civil rights and
liberties of everyone.
The various clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment reflect that
development.”).
128. Patrick Cronin, The Historical Origins of the Conflict Between Copyright and the First
Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 221, 245 (2012).
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citizenship on African-Americans, was instead used to demonstrate that there
must be some distinction between national and state citizenship, enabling the
majority to minimize the content of the former.129
Though this familiar example of constitutional interpretation has often
been understood as a willful misreading, it is in the de Manian sense simply
an illustration of reading itself.130 The framers’ language escapes not only
the original intent of those framers but also any theory of reading. Neither
originalism nor any other attempt to fix the meaning of constitutional text is
of much use in the face of the malleability of language and its ability to take
on new meanings in varying contexts. Or, put differently, it is impossible to
accept that any constitutional theory provides definitive answers to
interpretive difficulties unless one simply refuses to read. To see certainty
anywhere in the constitutional text is simply to refuse to read it.
B.

The Meaning of the Religion Clauses

The First Amendment to the Constitution proclaims that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”131 Since the Supreme Court and lower courts began
enforcing the religion clauses in the first half of the twentieth century,
debates have swirled around issues such as what it means to “establish”
religion and when a law can be said to “prohibit” the exercise of religion.132
The term “establishment of religion,” and its changing shape over the
decades, has arguably been an important undercurrent in the shifting
doctrinal landscape.
The word “religion” is notoriously difficult to define, and the Supreme
Court has largely dodged responsibility for attaching a definitive meaning to
the term in the constitutional context.133 But setting aside philosophical
debates about what does and does not constitute a belief system that can
properly be characterized as a “religion,” the term in its constitutional
dimension unquestionably has, and has long had, a significant cultural and

129. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74–78.
130. I emphasize here that this example is merely an illustration, and not a definitive proof, of
de Man’s theory. A meaningful attempt to demonstrate the truth of the theory on empirical rather
than conceptual grounds would require an exhaustive study of constitutional interpretation, certainly
one beyond the scope of this Article.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874–75 (2005) (“The First
Amendment contains no textual definition of ‘establishment,’ and the term is certainly not selfdefining . . . . There is no simple answer, for more than one reason.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 n.21 (1947) (collecting cases elaborating on the meaning and scope of the religion
clauses).
133. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (avoiding constitutional questions
by declining to articulate a definition of religion for purposes of constitutional claims); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court
construed the term “Supreme Being” in the conscientious objector statute broadly so as to avoid
constitutional issues (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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political dimension. Regardless of what religion means in a technical sense,
the language and practices that appear religious, as opposed to merely
cultural, have changed over time and in doing so have reflected cultural and
political realities on the ground.
Abington School District v. Schempp134 is one example. In that
challenge to the then-common practice of reading Bible verses, without
commentary, in the public schools, one of the principal arguments in the case
was that the Bible was not a sectarian document and that the reading of
verses did not constitute a form of religious instruction—at most, it was
merely “moral” education.135 Of course, as many commentators have
observed, the practice of Bible reading may not have seemed particularly
religious, or certainly not sectarian, to many Protestants at the time.136 The
schools, which had, after all, originated as places of Christian learning,
retained a sort of pan-Protestant character well into the twentieth century.137
The practice of reading unadorned verses from the King James Bible was
seen as an accommodation of the various Protestant denominations that were
represented in the school, but it was of course deeply alienating to Catholics
and Jews, in particular, whose numbers were significant and growing.138 The
Bible reading was experienced as a sectarian act by members of those
groups, because the Jewish religion does not recognize the New Testament
and Catholics use a different version of the Bible—the Douay.139
It would be hard to come up with a clearer example of a situation where
the changing social context—here, the increased religious diversity in
American society—changed the understanding of a particular constitutional
concept. The Bible reading could be recognized as a sectarian religious
practice, and therefore an unconstitutional establishment of religion, only in a
culture where it was no longer accepted as universal. Of course, religious
diversity did not suddenly arise in the twentieth century in the United States,
and indeed fierce battles were fought over sectarian religious practices in the
nineteenth century as well.140 But until roughly the era of Schempp and its
predecessor, Engel v. Vitale,141 it would be fair to suggest that, for most

134. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
135. STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, ELLERY’S PROTEST: HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION
& SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 163–66, 185–87 (2007).
136. See, e.g., id. at 130–31 (citing RICHARD B. DIERENFIELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 50–51 (1962)) (suggesting that Bible reading was “often part of a broader devotional
service, typically short in duration and held at the beginning of the day”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 309–10
(2001) (observing a growing public secularism, including among Protestants).
137. See, e.g., SOLOMON, supra note 135, at 99–101, 108.
138. Id. at 113–14; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 279.
139. SOLOMON, supra note 135, at 63.
140. Id. at 115–31; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 299–305.
141. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Americans, Bible reading simply faded into the background political and
social culture.142
To take an even more contemporary example, consider the
constitutional conundrum of so-called “ceremonial deism”—official religious
references that are so familiar and deeply rooted in American tradition that
they are often considered to be more patriotic than sectarian in nature.143
Common examples include the national motto “In God We Trust,” the words
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, and swearing “so help me God” for
judicial and other official proceedings.144 It seems reasonable to think that
the only thing standing between invalidation of such practices under
Schempp and the currently prevailing assumption that such phrases are
generally constitutional145 is the background religious culture against which
they are read. As at least one commentator has pointed out, if the name
“Allah” were substituted for “God,” it would be hard to see these phrases as
similarly innocuous, nonsectarian, and nonreligious.146 If the United States
came to be dominated by citizens of nonmonotheistic religions, it seems
difficult to imagine that these words would still be read as fundamentally
nonreligious, their historical pedigree notwithstanding.
At the same time, the inevitable openness of what constitutes an
“establishment of religion” has opened up the term to attacks from the
opposite direction, creating the possibility of claims that driving religious
speech and practice out of the public square has established a “religion” of
secularism.147 Though still quite tenuous under Establishment Clause
doctrine, it is easy to see how this understanding of religion could arise from
a context in which a Christian majority experiences the sudden absence of its
discourse from the public square, seemingly replaced by an equally
comprehensive doctrine.148 The term “religion” is thus capable of expansion

142. See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 136, at 299 (asserting that public education in
America was, from the beginning, “religious but nonsectarian”).
143. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2094–95 (1996) (defining ceremonial deism).
144. See id. at 2091–92 (giving examples of ceremonial deism).
145. See, e.g., id. at 2091–94 (describing numerous Supreme Court opinions in which the
Justices have assumed, without deciding, that various types of ceremonial deism were
constitutional).
146. See id. at 2084–85.
147. See, e.g., McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1330–31, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a suit asserting that the Alabama Supreme Court’s removal of
the Ten Commandments from a state building unconstitutionally established a religion of
“nontheistic beliefs[]”); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 519, 524 (9th Cir.
1994) (affirming the dismissal of a suit claiming that evolutionism is a “religious belief system” that
public school teachers cannot be required to teach).
148. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671,
672–74 (1992) (discussing the “strongly felt perception” that religious viewpoints are systematically
marginalized relative to secular ones in American public life and asserting that “many religious
people clearly feel excluded and alienated from public life”).
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to the point where it can mean both belief in a Supreme Being and the
absence of all such belief.
This brief illustration of the difficulties associated with defining
“religion” and religious “establishment” tracks the theory outlined in Part II
in two ways. First, and most basically, it shows that we cannot really make
sense of the term “establishment of religion”—at least not as a term with
legal force and meaning—without drawing on the broader religious, political,
and cultural context. Indeed, “religion” itself is a word that is undeniably
infused with cultural significance—it is a fact of cultural and social life. And
it seems beyond dispute that, with respect to the religion clauses, the
changing cultural context has changed the understanding of those terms.
(This is not to say that their meaning is, or ever was, uncontested, of course.
It is precisely a feature of meaning’s context dependency that meaning is
highly unstable.) Second, the possibility of changing meanings undermines
the possibility of theoretical coherence. Though an originalist might argue
that practices such as ceremonial deism do not constitute “religious”
practices or an “establishment of religion” according to the original
understanding of those terms, it is exceedingly difficult to see the relevance
of that conclusion today, in light of the religious diversity that exists in the
United States. To assert that invocations of God would not have been
controversial or would not have struck the Framers as religious tells us very
little about what is religious or sectarian when the Constitution is read in the
contemporary context. Any attempt to explain the acceptability of such
religious references in the eighteenth century must be able to acknowledge
the radically different religious landscape of today’s society and explain why
the acceptability of such references in the eighteenth century is relevant
today.
IV. Implications
The problem of reading and the concomitant failure of constitutional
theory ultimately create a dilemma that reading itself cannot get us out of.
What, then, can be done? As stated earlier, this Article is sympathetic to the
view that, since the mutual influence and interaction of law and politics is
inevitable, the only option is simply to embrace it. The inherent instability of
language should make judges suspicious of the value of any constitutional
theory but keenly attentive to the need to read the text. Though reading does
not lead to certainty, it perhaps leads to an interpretive openness that is
valuable in making sense of an enduring document in an ever-changing
society.
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To the extent that this conception of constitutional theory appears to
undermine its strength and validity, I would like to suggest that this should
not necessarily be a source of anxiety, as it has apparently been for at least
some courts and commentators alike.149 If politics, in the broad sense of
public affairs or “facts on the ground,” inevitably helps to shape meaning,
then there is no reason to bemoan or attempt to avoid this state of affairs.
This perspective implies that recognition of the social context in which
interpretation occurs is not only not illegitimate; it is necessary and desirable,
even if it does not always lead judges to reach results that may be considered
desirable from the perspective of all observers. Indeed, the theory of
meaning presented here clearly eschews the possibility of single, correct
legal answers.
This perspective also implies that judges should not be constitutional
theorists.150 They should, above all, be close readers of texts. For this
reason, they are trained to read and interpret legal documents. Moreover,
though inevitably influenced by their own personal backgrounds and the
culture that surrounds them, they are at least somewhat constrained by the
text at hand. In no sense does postmodern theory deny the reality of such a
constraint. Indeed, judges’ ability to independently investigate the case at
hand is intentionally limited (especially for appellate judges)—they lack the
staff and the wide-ranging subpoena power of legislatures. Their primary
tools are access to mounds of precedent and the assistance of recently minted
law graduates, themselves purportedly expert readers. It is, thus, both an
assertion of judicial supremacy and a limitation on that branch to say, simply,
that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”151
It is true, of course, that this understanding of the judge’s role with
respect to reading privileges that reading over those of other constitutional
actors—democratically elected officials as well as the people themselves. In
my understanding here, judges are, like literary critics, a species of expert
readers, and they do occupy a special position with respect to the interpretive
undertaking. Their readings are influenced by the social and political context
that they inhabit, as well as their personal biases. At the same time, they are
in some measure constrained by text and precedent and indoctrinated with
the view that law must consist of something other than raw preference.

149. See supra text accompanying notes 2–9.
150. Judge Richard Posner makes the argument that judges should not engage in moral theory
but instead should be pragmatists in Problematics, supra note 40, at 1645.
151. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Indeed, the notion that the
judiciary’s duty is “to say what the law is” seems itself to partake of two possible meanings of the
word “say”—one descriptive, one performative. Does the judiciary “say” what the law is as if it is
just reading some unseen script that is determinate and fixed, but only revealed upon careful study
(like one might “say” the Pledge of Allegiance)? Or does it “say” what the law is by imposing its
“say-so”—that is, by declaring or effectuating what the law is (as one might say, or pronounce, the
meaning of a particular constitutional provision)?
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Though no reader is an ideal or perfect reader—such a creature hardly seems
possible—there need not be elitism in simply asserting that judges are
uniquely well-trained readers of particular kinds of texts.
Reading is, after all, a skill—just ask any literary critic.

